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The dynamics of jury deliberations have received limited attention from
the legal community, perhaps because they occur behind closed doors.1
But social scientists' empirical studies provide a key to understanding the
effects that group dynamics have on the deliberation process.' One pattern
that social scientists' studies of mock juries have identified is that women's
participation rate is significantly lower than men's participation rate dur-
ing deliberations. 3
Part I of this Note examines the findings of these empirical studies, and
Part II argues that the jury cannot perform its fact-finding, interpretative,
or educational functions effectively if it fails to consider the views of all its
members. Women generally need to speak more and men generally need
to listen more if the jury is to engage in effective group deliberations that
will allow for the articulation of a range of community values and the
rendering of accurate verdicts. Representativeness and accuracy are criti-
cal because both the plaintiff and defendant depend upon the jury's ability
to discern the truth and to mete out justice.
Part III draws from the findings of organizational behavior and offers
recommendations to reduce the detrimental effects of gender-related be-
I. The legal community's interest in jury deliberations has focused primarily on the pre-
deliberation selection of jurors. Lawyers want to select jurors who have characteristics suggesting that
they will be sympathetic to the lawyers' clients. They want to be able to predict which jurors will vote
in the client's favor in the deliberation room. However, lawyers have paid only limited attention to
considering how the jurors will interact with each other during deliberations and how the group
deliberation process will affect individual jurors' votes.
One of the most publicized examples of jury selection was for the Harrisburg conspiracy trial, in
which defendants were charged with conspiring to raid draft boards, destroy records, kidnap Henry
Kissinger, and blow up heating tunnels in Washington, D.C. The defense attorneys relied on a team
of social scientists and activists to develop juror profiles and to select jurors who would be sympathetic
to the case. The team analyzed background characteristics, such as age, race, religion, and sex, to try
to predict jurors' sympathies. Schulman, Shaver, Colman, Emrich & Christie, Recipe for a Jury,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, May 1973, at 37.
This emphasis on pre-deliberation selection may begin to change as lawyers learn more about the
deliberation process. Recently, lawyers and other television viewers had the rare opportunity to wit-
ness an actual jury deliberation. The case concerned Leroy Reed, a man with limited intelligence, a
second grade reading ability, and a previous felony conviction, who was charged with illegal posses-
sion of a handgun. Frontline obtained permission to film the actual jury deliberations, which lasted
approximately two and one-half hours and were condensed to an hour for television. Frontline: Inside
the Jury Room (WGBH television broadcast, Apr. 8, 1986).
2. See generally Davis, Bray & Holt, The Empirical Study of Decision Processes in Juries: A
Critical Review, in LAW, JUSTICE AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL
ISSUES 341-51 (J. Tapp & F. Levine eds. 1977) (review of empirical studies on jury deliberations).
3. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. Throughout this Note, participation or partici-
pation rate will refer to a measure of verbal participation, or the amount a person talks.
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havior. The court has several means by which it can educate jurors about
the need for male and female jurors to speak and to listen during delibera-
tions. The court can use the juror handbook, introductory videotape or
film, and questions during voir dire to teach jurors to be aware of who is
participating and who is silent. It can officially charge the foreperson and
other jurors to encourage those who are silent to speak and those who are
dominating to listen. Education about group dynamics is critical both to
the litigants, whose case is being decided, and to the jurors, whose jury
duty can teach positive or negative lessons about democracy.
I. GENDER AND PARTICIPATION RATES
Most jury studies analyze the effects of gender on an individual level,
attempting to establish a relation between gender and an individual's bi-
ases.4 For example, one study found that male jurors judged attractive
female defendants guilty less often, assigned them lighter punishments,
and rated them better-liked than their unattractive counterparts.5 Such
studies, however, fail to recognize that jury deliberations are a group pro-
cess, and that the group decision is not simply a sum of the biases that
individuals bring to the deliberations.6 Consequently, it is important to
study the effects of gender within the group decision-making process.
4. See, e.g., Costantini, Mallery & Yapundich, Gender and Juror Partiality: Are Women More
Likely To Prejudge Guilt?, 67 JUDICATURE 121, 126 (1983) (women show greater propensity than
men to prejudge defendant guilty); Stephan, Sex Prejudice in Jury Simulation, 88 J. PSYCHOLOGY
305, 306 (1974) (jurors less likely to find defendant of their own sex guilty).
5. Efran, The Effect of Physical Appearance on the Judgment of Guilt, Interpersonal Attraction,
and Severity of Recommended Punishment in a Simulated Jury Task, 8 J. RES. PERSONALITY 45
(1974); see also Sigall & Ostrove, Beautiful but Dangerous: Effects of Offender Attractiveness and
Nature of the Crime on Juridic Judgment, 31 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 410 (1975)
(both men and women more likely to give lenient treatment to attractive defendants than to unattrac-
tive defendants when crime is unrelated to attractiveness).
6. The premise of such studies is that groups are merely the sum of their parts. Foss suggests that
such studies should not even be called simulated juror studies: "It is not clear whether we can even
meaningfully speak of simulated jurors without employing a group deliberation. Investigations of
these individual phenomena would be more appropriately referred to as studies of individual judgment
rather than of simulated jurors." Foss, Group Decision Processes in the Simulated Trial Jury, 39
SOCIOMETRY 305, 305 n.1 (1976); see also Izzett & Leginski, Group Discussion and the Influence of
Defendant Characteristics in a Simulated Jury Setting, 93 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 271, 276 (1974)
(after group discussion, mock jurors assigned unattractive defendant more lenient sentence than before
group discussion).
In their seminal work on the jury, Kalven and Zeisel overlooked jury deliberations completely.
Their findings suggested that jurors made decisions before deliberations began. H. KALVEN & H.
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 488 (1966). The authors may have overlooked the role of the delibera-
tions because they were working from judges' assessments of juries' verdicts, without access to data
about the deliberations. Their earlier efforts to record actual jury deliberations, which were thwarted
by Congress, speak to their recognition of the importance of jury deliberations. Recording of Jury
Deliberations: Hearings on S. Res. 58 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Administration of the
Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1955) (testimony of Professor Harry Kalven). The hearings led to a statute
forbidding the recording or observation of jury deliberations in federal courts. See 18 U.S.C. § 1508
(1982).
Gender and Juries
In jury deliberations, gender is important from the moment jurors enter
the jury room and decide where to sit. One important finding that
emerges from empirical studies is that the jury usually selects the foreper-
son from one of the two people seated at either end of the table.7 Men are
more likely than women to assume the end positions.' Not surprisingly,
men are also more likely than women to be selected as the foreperson,9
though their selection is not due solely to their seating choice.'0
The foreperson can play a critical role in leading the jury to a verdict.
He is in a unique position from which to influence the style and direction
of the discussion and usually participates more than any other juror." In
more than one study, the foreperson spoke nearly three times as much as
the average juror.'2 Even though the foreperson frequently summarized
7. According to one study in small group behavior, "the leader usually sat at an end position" at
the rectangular table. Sommer, Leadership and Group Geography, 24 SOCIOMETRY 99, 102 (1961).
Another study found that "[t]he leader usually occupies the head of the table . . . and conversely the
person who sits at the head of the table is usually perceived as the leader." M. SHAW, GROUP DY-
NAMICS 136 (1976). For jury studies on seating that are still regarded as leaders in the field despite
the passage of time, see Strodtbeck & Hook, The Social Dimensions of a Twelve-Man Jury Table, 24
SoCIOMETRY 397, 400 (1961) (in 32 out of 69 experimental jury deliberations, foreperson was se-
lected from one of two persons seated at ends of table); C. Hawkins, Interaction and Coalition
Realignments in Consensus-Seeking Groups: A Study of Experimental Jury Deliberations 23 (Aug.
17, 1960) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago) (among 69 civil juries, it was
three times more likely than chance that foreperson would be selected from one of two jurors occupy-
ing end position at table). Recent manuals follow the conclusions reached in these early findings. See,
e.g., L. SMITH & L. MALANDRO, COURTROOM COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES § 4.47, at 423 (1985)
("Those jurors who sit at the end of the table . . . are much more likely to be selected as the
foreperson.").
8. C. Hawkins, supra note 7, at 17.
9. Beckham & Aronson, Selection ofJury Foremen as a Measure of the Social Status of Women,
43 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 475, 476-77 (1978) (in 155 juries, women elected as foreperson one fifth as
often as their number would indicate); Strodtbeck, James & Hawkins, Social Status injury Delibera-
tions, 22 AM. Soc. REV. 713, 715 (1957) [hereinafter Strodtbeck] ("only one-fifth as many women
were made foreman as would be expected by chance"); C. Hawkins, supra note 7, at 24 (women
constituted 36% of jurors, but only 3% of forepersons); see also R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PEN-
NINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 28 (1983) [hereinafter R. HASTIE] ("[males, higher classes, and end
seating are overrepresented" in role of foreperson); R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF
INSANITY 114 (1967) (businessmen had four times better chance of being selected as foreperson than
male laborers; housewives were never selected).
10. Even when women sit in the end position, both men and women are less likely to recognize
them as leaders because of sex stereotypes of women as followers. Porter & Geis, Women and Non-
verbal Leadership Cues: When Seeing Is Not Believing, in GENDER AND NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR 53
(C. Mayo & N. Henley eds. 1981); see also infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (discussion of
men's status in society and in jury room as contributing factor to their selection as foreperson).
11. The most recent studies support the results of earlier studies that the foreperson speaks more
than any other juror. R. SIMON, supra note 9, at 114-15 (mean participation rate of foreperson was
31.1%, compared to 7.5% for other jurors); Sannito & Arnolds, Jury Study Results: The Factors at
Work, 5 TRIAL DIPL. J. 6, 7 (1982) (From 550 completed juror questionnaires, 79% of jurors de-
scribed foreperson as either "'talkative,'" "'one of the most talkative,'" or "'the most talkative'"
compared to other jurors.); Strodtbeck, supra note 9, at 716 (foreperson was responsible for approxi-
mately one fourth of total acts).
12. R. HA9i E, supra note 9, at 145; C. Hawkins, supra note 7, at 26. Forepersons devoted a
greater proportion of their statements to legal and organizational issues compared to other jurors and
made fewer statements about their own verdict preference. In other areas, "their contributions were
similar to those of other jurors, albeit more frequent." R. HAStIE, supra note 9, at 145.
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the points made by other jurors, 3 the magnitude of difference in partici-
pation rates suggests that the foreperson contributed disproportionately to
the jury deliberations. 4
If the foreperson is excluded from the calculation, male jurors still have
a higher participation rate than female jurors during the deliberation.
Even adjusting for the difference in proportion of men and women, male
jurors offered forty percent more comments than female jurors.' 5 Al-
though the percentages differ slightly from study to study, the proposition
that men participate at a significantly higher rate than women is well
supported.'
6
Participation during deliberations is critical because the jury performs
its task through the verbal communication of ideas. Those jurors who
speak the most are viewed as the most persuasive by their peers. 17 Men,
who participate at a greater rate than women, are viewed by other jurors
as having more influence and displaying greater leadership than women.' 8
13. When the foreperson is summarizing points raised by other jurors, he is still selecting which
comments to emphasize, and consequently, exerting influence on the discussion.
14. R. HASTIE, supra note 9, at 145.
15. Id. at 141-42.
16. See, e.g., James, Status and Competence of Jurors, 64 AM. J. Soc. 563, 564 (1959) (average
level of participation was 9% for male juror and 7% for female juror); Strodtbeck, supra note 9, at
715 (rate of participation was 9.6% for male jurors and 6.6% for female jurors); C. Hawkins, supra
note 7, at 34 (average participation level of white male was 7.9% and of white female was 6.1%); see
also Strodtbeck & Mann, Sex Role Differentiation in Jury Deliberations, 19 SOCIOMETRY 3, 5
(1956) (male jurors initiate more discussion than female jurors in mock jury trials). But see R. SIMON,
supra note 9, at 115-16. Simon did not find a difference between men's and women's participation
rates in her study. Both men and women had a mean participation rate of 7.5%. Id. One of the cases,
however, involved incest, and in crimes against children, women might speak more frequently. Id. at
116.
17. See R. HASTIE, supra note 9, at 145-46 (persuasive juror was likely to be educated male who
participated frequently in deliberation); James, supra note 16, at 566-68 (jurors with highest partici-
pation rate or highest level of education were seen as most persuasive); Strodtbeck, supra note 9, at
715-16 (men participated at greater rate than women and were viewed by other jurors as more useful
in deliberation process). But see R. SIMON, supra note 9, at 119. According to Simon, men who spoke
more did not wield more influence, defined as "the ability of the members of a minority faction to
persuade the majority to their point of view," than those who spoke less.
18. See L. SMITH & L. MALANDRO, supra note 7, § 4.48, at 424 ("How much is said . . .
appears to be more important to the perception of leadership than what is said .... "); Hollander,
Women and Leadership, in I SMALL GROUPS AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 425 (H. Blumberg, A.
Hare, V. Kent & M. Davies eds. 1983) ("Members who participate more are likely to be more
influential and to be seen as leaders."); Regula & Julian, The Impact of Quality and Frequenty of
Task Contributions on Perceived Ability, 89 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 115, 120 (1973) (individual who
contributes more frequently to discussion is perceived as more "able" than one who contributes less
frequently); Sorrentino & Boutillier, The Effect of Quantity and Quality of Verbal Interaction on
Ratings of Leadership Ability, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 403, 408 (1975) ("quantity
and not quality of verbal interaction is the better predictor of leadership").
According to another research team's findings, male mock jurors who participated at a higher rate
than female mock jurors were perceived as more influential, active, and leader-like than the female
mock jurors. Nemeth, Endicott & Wachtler, From the '50s to the '70s: Women in Jury Deliberations,
39 SocioME:TRY 293, 299 (1976) (hereinafter Nemeth]. But in a second study, involving male and
female mock jurors who participated at equal rates, the men were still perceived as more influential,
active, and leader-like than the women. Id. at 300, 302. Such data suggest that both gender and
Gender and Juries
The sheer quantity of their comments gives weight to their content.'9 The
ideas of male jurors, then, receive more attention than those of their fe-
male counterparts.
The status that society at large assigns to men contributes to the differ-
ence in men's and women's participation rates in the jury room.20 When
men and women enter the jury room, they do not leave behind the lessons
that society teaches about appropriate behavior for men's and women's
interaction.21 Power relations of male dominance and female subordina-
tion are manifested in the jury room through gender-related behavior.
Such patterns of behavior are often difficult to detect because they are
embedded in our society, but they nonetheless function to limit women's
participation. For example, studies show that men speak more often, at
greater length, and are more likely to interrupt other speakers than
women.22 One effect of this male behavior is that women's silences
participation rates are factors in determining jurors' persuasiveness. The authors found that men and
women, consistent with "the folklore of attorneys, tended to assume that women are relatively more
passive, weak, and non-influential." Id. at 304 (emphasis added); see also Broverman, Vogel, Brover-
man, Clarkson & Rosenkrantz, Sex-Role Stereotypes: A Current Appraisal, 28 J. Soc. IssuEs 59, 69
(1972) (college students, "a group which tends to be critical of traditional social norms and conven-
tions," approved of sex-role stereotypes of women as less aggressive, dominant, active, and competent
than men).
19. See Hoffman, Group Problem Solving, in GROUp PROCESSES 73 (L. Berkowitz ed. 1978)
("he who talks the most is likely to promote his solution to the group successfully"); Bavelas, Hastorf,
Gross & Kite, Experiments on the Alteration of Group Structure, I J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSY-
cHoLoGY 55, 59 (1965) [hereinafter Bavelas] (group members perceived those who spoke most often
to offer best ideas and guidance).
20. One theory claims that the sex of an individual confers a certain status. Males have a higher
status than females, and consequently, males are expected to make more contributions, to have more
influence, and to receive more expressions of approval than females for whom there are lower per-
formance expectations. See Meeker & Weitzel-O'Neill, Sex Roles and Interpersonal Behavior in
Task-Oriented Groups, 42 AM. Soc. REv. 91, 95 (1977). Such expectations would explain why men
and women perceive men to be more influential and to display greater leadership than women even
when men and women are participating at the same rate. See Nemeth, supra note 18, at 302-03.
According to Rosabeth Moss Kanter's theory, men and women may not be "peers" in mixed groups
because of differences in status and power. She concludes that "[t/he resulting behavior, including
frequency of participation, leadership, and conformity, may reflect status and power differences more
than sex-linked personality traits." Kanter, Women and the Structure of Organizations: Explorations
in Theory and Behavior, in ANOTHER VOICE 56 (M. Millman & R. Kanter eds. 1975). Kanter also
suggests that women injury studies, as in corporations, may assume traditional roles because they are
outnumbered by men and that male-female interaction will change when both sexes are equally repre-
sented. R. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 208 (1977). One problem for the
jury, however, is that the number of women and men on any given jury cannot be guaranteed.
21. For an account of how power relations define gender roles, see generally MacKinnon, Femi-
nism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CUL-
TURE & SOC'Y 635 (1983) ("Male and female are created through the erotization of dominance and
submission. The man/woman difference and the dominance/submission dynamic define each other.").
22. N. HENLEY, BODY POLITICS 74 (1977) (men speak more often than women in both single-
sex and mixed-sex groups or pairs, as well as among experimentally created pairs or groups and
actual husband-wife couples); Baird, Sex Differences in Group Communication: A Review of Rele-
vant Research, 62 Q.J. SPEECH 179, 181 (1976) ("males used more words, talked more often, and, in
mixed groups, interrupted females more frequently than females interrupted them"); West & Zim-
merman, Small Insults: A Study of Interruptions in Cross-Sex Conversations Between Unacquainted
Persons, in LANGUAGE, GENDER AND SOCIrY 107 (B. Thorne, C. Kramarae & N. Henley eds.
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lengthen as men interrupt, overlap, or give a delayed or minimal response
to the female speaker." One obvious way to maintain power in a group is
to monopolize and control discussion. Those who have power can do the
talking; those who lack power must do the listening.2
The power relations of male dominance and female subordination that
structure our society also shape our legal institutions. As feminist writers
have observed, the legal system neither operates neutrally toward, nor in-
dependently of, power relations in society. 5 Legal institutions, including
the jury, were structured by men for their protection and benefit. Not
surprisingly, they preserve and reflect the power imbalance that occurs in
society at large.
1983) (in cross-sex conversations, men are three times more likely than women to interrupt other
speaker).
Nonverbal behavior, such as gesture, movement, touch, gaze, and spatial arrangements, also perpet-
uate gender differences in power and status:
The "trivia" of everyday life . . . touching others, dropping the eyes, smiling, interrupting,
and so on . . . are commonly understood as facilitators of social intercourse, but are not recog-
nized as defenders of the status quo-of the state, of the wealthy, of authority, of all those
whose power may be challenged. Nevertheless, these minutiae find their place on a continuum
of social control which extends from internalized socialization . . . to sheer physical force
Henley, Power, Sex, and Nonverbal Communication, in LANGUAGE AND SEX 184 (B. Thorne & N.
Henley eds. 1975).
23. Zimmerman & West, Sex Roles, Interruptions and Silences in Conversation, in LANGUAGE
AND SEX, supra note 22, at 118 (in cross-sex segments of conversation, 62% of females' aggregate
silence followed after a male's delayed or minimal response, overlap, or interruption).
24. See Marcus, Spiegelman, DuBois, Dunlap, Gilligan, MacKinnon & Menkel-Meadow, The
1984 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture: Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Con-
versation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11, 62 (1985). Carol Gilligan uses her examples of Amy and Jake to
make the more general observation that "[i]f you have power, you can opt not to listen. And you do so
with impunity." Id. at 62; see also note 46 (detailed discussion of Amy's and Jake's different modes of
moral reasoning).
25. Our legal system reflects the male point of view because men, as the members of society with
power, can structure the law to reflect and protect their needs. "The law sees and treats women the
way men see and treat women." MacKinnon, supra note 21, at 644. MacKinnon argues that society's
power relations-male dominance and female subordination-explain the legal system's current in-
ability to respond to women's subjection to sexual harassment. See C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HA-
RASSMENT 158 (1979) ("Because sexual harassment. . . has appeared so much a part of the normal
and expectable behavior between the sexes, the law has fallen short of women's needs and
aspirations.").
The legal system, according to Tong, is "skewed in ways that favor men's interests and rights." R.
TONG, WOMEN, SEX, AND THE LAW 205 (1984). It has long treated woman-battering as "a trivial or
a largely imagined phenomenon, as a woman's deserved treatment rather than the criminal violation
of her rights." Id. at 124. Although the victim can theoretically pursue remedies in criminal or tort
law, these remedies are not always enforced by the state. See, e.g., Note, Battered Women and the
Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitution Help Them When the Police Won't?, 95 YALE L.J.
788 (1986) (failure of police to arrest battering husbands violates women's equal protection right and
perpetuates men's domination over women). For another critique of the legal system as male-
dominated and male-structured, see Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, in THE Poutr-
ICs OF LAw 301 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) ("The whole structure of law-its hierarchical organization; its
combative, adversarial format; and its undeviating bias in favor of rationality over all other val-
ues-defines it as a fundamentally patriarchal institution.").
Gender and Juries
II. THE NECESSITY OF FULL PARTICIPATION
The jury performs several functions in American society. One of the
jury's roles, and perhaps its least controversial role, is to serve as fact-
finder.26 Another role of the jury is to apply (or not to apply) the law to
the facts; in this case the jury performs a law-making function. 27 In addi-
tion, the jury plays an educational role: It teaches the citizenry about de-
mocracy and its concomitant responsibilities.2" All of these roles can best
be served if women participate fully in jury deliberations.
A. Improving the Accuracy of Jury Fact-Finding
Women need to speak more and men need to listen more if the jury is
to enjoy the benefits of "group" deliberation.29 Unless both men and
women speak and are heard during the deliberations, the jury will con-
sider and decide from only a limited view of the facts and evidence. In-
26. See, e.g., Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 386,
387 (1954) ("The jury's central legal function is to resolve the factual disputes involved in a law
suit."). Broeder, however, questions the jury's ability to perform this task. See id. at 390; see also
Note, The Federal Jury Selection Act of 1968: A Critique, 2 COLUM. SURv. HuM. RTs. L. 52, 54
(1969-1970) ("Three interrelated tasks [of the jury] are generally recognized: the jury's fact-finding
function; its legislative function; and the 'good exercise in democracy' function.").
27. Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, 43 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51, 68. To fulfill this task properly, a jury must be selected from a
representative cross section of the community. Different segments of the community may have differ-
ent perspectives and all of these perspectives should be heard. See Kershen, Vicinage, 30 OKLA. L.
REv. 1, 83 (1977) ("Unless the jury applies the law to the facts so as to articulate the community
sense of justice, there is justifiable fear that the jury will not feel responsibility for the verdict ren-
dered. Unless the jury renders a verdict in which the community sense of justice is articulated, an
accused may not feel that he has been judged, but rather may feel he has been processed."). It is not
always easy to distinguish between the jury's functions of fact-finding and of applying law to fact. See,
e.g., Broeder, supra note 26, at 406.
28. See, e.g., Broeder, supra note 26, at 419 ("Jury service furnishes the only means, other than
by voting, through which the citizen can actually participate in the administration of government.");
Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1062 (1964) ("[Tlhe jury provides an
important civic experience for the citizen. . . . The heart of the matter, the trial itself and the delib-
eration, is very often a major and moving experience in the life of the citizen-juror."); Kershen, supra
note 27, at 83 ("As Thomas Jefferson stated, participation of the ordinary citizen on a jury permits a
democratic element to be preserved in the administration of justice by the judicial branch of the
government.").
29. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 233 (1978) ("When individual and group decisionmak-
ing were compared, it was seen that groups performed better because prejudices of individuals were
frequently counterbalanced, and objectivity resulted."); Kalven, supra note 28, at 1067 ("Different
jurors remember, and make available to all, different items of the trial so that the jury as a group
remembers far more than most of its members could as individuals."); see also L. SMITH & L. MA-
LANDRO, supra note 7, § 4.39, at 409 ("group judgments are usually as good as and often superior to
individual judgments"); Barnlund, A Comparative Study of Individual, Majority, and Group Judg-
ment, 58 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 55 (1959) (in freshman course, least skilled problem
solvers working in groups solved syllogisms as well as most skilled members working alone). The
author explained that "[g]roup decisions, reached through cooperative deliberation, are significantly
superior to decisions made by individual members working alone" because group discussion "was
found to stimulate more careful thinking, to lead to a consideration of a wider range of ideas, and to
provoke more objective and critical testing of conclusions." Id. at 59-60. This study, though done in
1959, was cited in 1978 by the Court in Ballen, 435 U.S. at 233 n.14.
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deed, as many studies demonstrate, the domination of a few and the si-
lence of others increase the likelihood of erroneous group decisions."0 If
those who are able to correct a mistaken view fail to speak, then the mis-
take will go uncorrected. In the case of the jury, an inaccurate decision
can have devastating consequences, particularly when it results in the
wrongful conviction of an innocent person.31
In Ballew v. Georgia,3 2 the Supreme Court, citing empirical studies,
33
pointed to the importance of memory in ensuring jury accuracy. 34 As ju-
ries decrease in size, the number of jurors who might remember different
pieces of evidence is reduced. Accordingly, the risk of convicting an inno-
cent person increases. If women systematically choose not to speak or men
choose not to listen when women do speak, then the jury is, in effect,
reduced in size. Memory gaps in the group's collective knowledge
increase.
In addition, if women participated fully in jury deliberations, they
would contribute facts that female, rather than male, jurors are more
likely to recall. Women are more likely to hear, see, or remember different
facts than men, not because of some natural difference, but because
women, in general, occupy a different place in society than men.3 5
30. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 19, at 68 (limited expression of ideas decreases chances that
group will reach correct solution); Maier & Solem, The Contribution of a Discussion Leader to the
Quality of Group Thinking: The Effective Use of Minority Opinions, 5 HuM. REL. 277, 285 (1952)
("free discussion tends to increase the number of correct answers to a problem for which a variety of
incorrect answers seems plausible").
31. As the Supreme Court acknowledged, "[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-
known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification." United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967); see, e.g., Campbell v. State, 186 Misc. 586, 62 N.Y.S.2d 638 (Ct.
Cl. 1946) (upholding constitutionality of special law awarding damages to claimant for erroneous
arrest, conviction, and confinement as result of mistaken identity); Hermann, The Case of the Jamai-
can Accent, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 30 (erroneous eyewitness identification led
to wrongful arrest of Ted Alston). See generally E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932)
(65 cases of wrongful convictions).
32. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
33. Id. at 232-39 (empirical studies demonstrate that reducing jury size to five members adversely
affects jury deliberations).
34. The Court in Ballew concluded that reducing the jury in a state criminal trial to five members
would reduce the amount of evidence accurately recalled by and available to the jurors, hinder effec-
tive jury deliberations, increase the likelihood of erroneous decisions, weaken the minority's ability to
defend its view, and decrease the representation of minorities on the jury. Id. at 232-38.
35. Professor Williams attributed this difference in perceptions to a difference in men's and
women's respective life experiences. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture,
Courts, and Feminism, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. (Rutgers Univ.) 175 (1982).
For an illustration of women's and men's different perceptions and judgments as a result of their
different positions in society, see Glaspell, A Jury of Her Peers, reprinted in THE BEST SHORT
STORIES OF 1917, at 256-82 (E. O'Brien ed. 1918). In this short story, a neighbor who had been
strangled in his sleep with a rope is discovered dead. His wife claims that she had been asleep beside
him, but had not been awakened. The sheriff and another neighbor, accompanied by their wives, and
the county attorney, go to the house to search for evidence. The men look in the bedroom and the barn
and are unable to discover the wife's motive for the murder of her husband. The women remain in the
kitchen where they focus on "the insignificance of kitchen things" and piece together the motive for
the murder. Id. at 263.
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According to one study, men and women both pay more attention to
and store more or better information about items that attract their inter-
est. 6 For example, women recalled better information about a female vic-
tim's actions, whereas men responded more accurately about the male
thief's appearance.
a7
One study has shown that although both men and women tend to over-
estimate witnesses' ability to identify a suspect, men do so more than
women."8 Such a gender difference is significant because jurors give eye-
witness testimony much more weight than other evidence."9 Because men
on juries participate more than women, one would predict that jury deci-
sions tend to overestimate eyewitness credibility. In fact, this is what stud-
ies have shown, though researchers have failed to note the causal rela-
tion.4" The jury's general tendency to accept the accuracy of eyewitness
testimony could be challenged if women voiced their views as often as men
did.
The men and women had the same evidence available to them, but they chose to focus on different
items because of their different perceptions about the items' importance. As a result, the men and
women arrived at different explanations for the crime. The story suggests not only that women see
things differently than men, but also that they evaluate their discoveries differently because of their
position in society. The women identified the murderer, but understood the circumstances that drove
her to such action. They also recognized that a male court of law was unlikely to understand or
sympathize with her circumstances. Weisbrod, Images of the Woman Juror, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
59, 76 (1986). The differences in perception and judgment suggested by this story are not immutable,
however, and will change as women's status and position in society change.
36. E. Lovrus, EYE~WVNESS TSTrIMONY 157 (1979); see also A. YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 91 (1979) (men and women differ in their observations of others); Pow-
ers, Andriks & Loftus, Eyewitness Accounts of Females and Males, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 339
(1979) (women were more accurate in their recollection of female-oriented items whereas men were
more accurate in their recollection of male-oriented items).
37. E. LoFtrus, supra note 36, at 157.
38. Brigham & Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors To Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewit-
ness Identifications, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19, 26-27 (1983) (subjects asked to estimate how many
witnesses correctly identified suspect in line-up). One possible explanation for this difference in per-
ception is that women are accustomed to seeing the world from a multiplicity of perspectives. They
are confronted with a "conflict between their own perceptions and often prevailing views of 'truth' or
'history.'" Letter from Professor Martha Minow, Harvard Law School, to author (Mar. 1, 1986). As
a result, they may be less accustomed to finding that "reality" is identical to their perceptions of
reality and may have less confidence than men that others can find such a correspondence. See infra
note 46 (discussion of women's tendency to accommodate several points of view, rather than to impose
single point of view).
39. E. LoFrus, supra note 36, at 10. Loftus identifies many factors, such as stereotypes, past
experience, prejudice, temporary expectations, stress, weapon focus, cross-racial identification, and
transference, to try to convince readers (and jurors) that eyewitness testimony is unreliable and should
be given less weight. Id. at 33-51; see also Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, Sm. AM., Dec. 1974, at
23 (describing factors that contribute to unreliability of eyewitness testimony).
40. See E. Lovrus, supra note 36, at 10; see also Brigham & Bothwell, supra note 38, at 27
(jurors find eyewitness evidence extremely persuasive). Although researchers have noted that there is
"some evidence of a sex effect" between males' and females' assessment of eyewitness credibility, id. at
27, they have failed to connect the jury's tendency to -overestimate eyewitness credibility with the male
jurors' tendency to dominate discussion.
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B. Improving the Effectiveness of the Deliberation Process
Women influence the interaction process that determines the group's
effectiveness in recalling different facts and in reaching an accurate ver-
dict. In one study of mock jury deliberations, the researchers identified
two contrasting deliberation styles."' A "verdict-driven" deliberation is
one that begins with a public ballot and is dominated by statements of
verdict preference. Individual jurors adopt one position and cite evidence
only in support of that position. In contrast, in "evidence-driven" deliber-
ations, public balloting occurs late in the process, and the group empha-
sizes story construction. Individual jurors offer evidence without reference
to a particular verdict, as they try to recreate the events at the time of the
alleged crime.
Research in organizational behavior shows that evidence-driven discus-
sions lead to better interaction, and consequently, to more accurate deci-
sions than verdict-driven discussions.42 Verdict-driven discussion creates
adversarial factions preoccupied with winning the point and silencing the
dissenters.43 Verdict-driven deliberations also involve fewer participants;
each side, rather than every individual, articulates its view. Because both
sides are often unwilling to relent, verdict-driven deliberations are more
likely to result in hung juries.44 Evidence-driven discussion relies upon
open communication so that all members feel that they have had a fair
chance to influence the decision.45 Those who have a different recollection
of the facts or who hold a minority opinion in the group speak because
others are willing to listen and to consider what they are saying.
41. R. HASTIE, supra note 9, at 163-65. In an earlier work, Hawkins also identified two styles of
jury deliberation: "deliberating in unity" and "deliberating in factions." C. Hawkins, supra note 7, at
106-09. Jurors deliberating in the former style presented arguments without being associated with
any particular verdict preference. Jurors deliberating in the latter style expressed their personal pref-
erence and then aligned with others who shared that viewpoint. Hawkins hypothesized that juries
"deliberating in unity" would reach "better" decisions than those "deliberating in factions": "A group
which tries to reach a decision without dividing into factions does not pay any attention to how the
people are lined up but only to how the weight of rational argument is lined up . . . ." Id. at 115.
42. Although R. HASTIE, supra note 9, at 163, used these terms, other studies in organizational
behavior recognize these two modes of discussion under different names. These studies also suggest
that the evidence-driven mode is more effective in producing accurate decisions or solutions. See, e.g.,
Hoffman, supra note 19, at 82 ("[Elvaluat[ing] suggested solutions as they appear, instead of waiting
until all suggestions are in and then making [a] choice . . . may promote a mediocre solution or it
may kill off a good one early.").
43. One organizational behavior study uses the terms "Decision by Majority Rule: Voting and/or
Polling" and "Decision by Consensus." E. SCHEIN, PROCESS CONSULTATION: ITS ROLE IN ORGANI-
ZATION DEVELOPMENT 55-56 (1969). According to Schein, the danger in decision by "Voting and/or
Polling" is that voting creates coalitions, which then focus on winning the battle. The minority mem-
bers may feel that they have insufficient opportunity to convince others of their point of view. Id. at
56.
44. See R. HASTIE, supra note 9, at 165-67; C. Hawkins, supra note 7, at 81.
45. E. SCHEIN, supra note 43, at 56-57. A disadvantage of this mode of deliberation is that it is
time-consuming.
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As studies have shown, women in general express more concern than
men about accommodating different points of view among members of a
group and translate that concern into an evidence-driven mode of discus-
sion."8 In studies of all-female groups, the more active speakers tried to
draw out the more silent members, which is a key characteristic of evi-
dence-driven juries. In contrast, in all-male groups, the more active mem-
bers eventually ignored the less active members, which is a key character-
istic of verdict-driven juries.4 The men displayed competitiveness with
other men, whereas the women expressed cooperation with other
women. 48 In mixed groups, however, the women consistently became more
silent. 9 If women are encouraged to speak more and men are reminded to
46. See Bond & Vinacke, Coalitions in Mixed-Sex Triads, 24 SOCIOMETRY 61, 72-73 (1961) (in
game situations, males adopt "exploitative" or competitive strategy, whereas females adopt more suc-
cessful "accommodative" or social relations strategy); Denmark, Styles of Leadership, 2 PSYCHOLOGY
WOMEN Q. 99, 110-11 (1977) ("The one difference investigators generally agree upon is women's
greater concern for relationships among people; this should be considered a plus in terms of leadership
effectiveness.").
For a theory of differences between men's and women's approaches to moral reasoning, see C.
GIL.IGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VoICE 24-63 (1982). Gilligan describes two modes of moral reasoning,
care-based and rights-based, and finds from her studies that women tend to adopt the former and men
the latter. She clarifies the distinction between the two modes by using the examples of Amy and
Jake, both of whom are asked to respond to Heinz's dilemma. Heinz's wife is dying, but because of
his penury he cannot afford the drug that will save her life, unless he is willing to steal it from the
pharmacist. Jake is willing to establish a hierarchy in which the conflicting rights of the pharmacist
and Heinz can be placed, whereas Amy is reluctant to impose such a hierarchy. Instead, she strives to
redefine the dilemma so that she no longer has to choose among the rights of the parties, but can
arrive at a solution that meets all of the parties' needs. See id. at 25-32. For a theory of the origin of
gender differences, see N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING 167 (1978) (girls
emerge from mother-child relationship with "stronger basis for experiencing another's needs or feel-
ings as one's own"); for a vision of what legal institutions would look like if informed by women's
values and approaches, as first suggested by Gilligan, see Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different
Voice: Speculations on a Woman's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985) (sug-
gesting that female lawyers can shape their profession by searching for solutions that encompass both
parties' needs rather than adopting traditional adversarial model, in which one party wins and other
loses).
47. Aries, Male-Female Interpersonal Styles in All Male, All Female and Mixed Groups, in
BEYOND SEX ROLES 294 (A. Sargent ed. 1977). In all-male groups, those who missed a session
became inactive speakers upon rejoining the group and were subsequently unable to assume important
positions in the group. In contrast, in all-female groups, those who missed a session were encouraged
to play a more active role in the group during the following session. See also Baird, supra note 22, at
189-90 (in all-male groups, weakest member is excluded; in all-female groups, any member in danger
of neglect is given encouragement).
48. Aries, Interaction Patterns and Themes of Male, Female, and Mixed Groups, 7 SMALL
GROUP BEHAV. 7, 13-14 (1976). Discussions in all-male groups were marked by competition and
aggression. The theme of victim and victimizer recurred in anecdotes about pranks, jokes, and clubs.
In contrast, discussions in all-female groups centered on feelings, affiliation, home, and family. See
Reed, Gender Issues in Training Group Leaders, J. SPECIALISTS GROUP WORK, Aug. 1981, at 161,
162 (all-male groups characterized by hierarchy and competition; all-female groups shared feelings
and discussed subjects in greater depth).
49. Aries, supra note 47, at 297 (in mixed groups, women spoke less, initiating only 34% of total
interaction); Reed, supra note 48, at 163 (in mixed groups, women spoke less, spoke primarily to
men, shared less personal information, and were less involved in topics and tasks associated with
masculinity).
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listen more,50 women may be able to bring to jury deliberations their ten-
dency to engage in evidence-driven discussion, which produces more accu-
rate decisions.
C. Broadening the Range of Perspectives Available to the Jury
Gender, like age and race, informs one's relations with others and one's
experiences and position in society. 5 Thus, the two genders have different
perspectives to contribute when determining facts and applying law to
facts. The use of juries is predicated on the assumption that different peo-
ple see things differently, and one function of the jury is to bring people's
different perceptions to the trial process.5 12 Indeed, in Taylor v. Louisi-
ana5 3 and Duren v. Missouri" the Supreme Court recognized the impor-
tance of juries composed of a cross section of the population, representing,
and presumably articulating, a broad spectrum of views. The Court reit-
erated in Ballew that the jury is often called upon to make difficult value
choices, and therefore, needs to draw upon "the sense of the entire com-
munity" to make such decisions.
55
50. Effective change in group dynamics requires the awareness and responsiveness of both quiet
and talkative members of the group: "[W]ithout some encouragement a quiet group member will not
spontaneously increase his output when other members are artificially depressed; and conversely it is
not enough to encourage a quiet individual to participate more unless 'room' is provided for his in-
creased output." Bavelas, supra note 19, at 67.
51. See Alderfer, An Intergroup Perspective on Group Dynamics, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZA-
TIONAL BEHAVIOR 219 (J. Lorsch ed., forthcoming).
Many feminist scholars argue that one's perspective is informed by one's gender; there is no "un-
gendered perspective": To believe in a universal, objective standpoint is to accept the male point of
view. MacKinnon, supra note 21, at 636; see also C. GILLIGAN, supra note 46, at 2 ("differences
arise in a social context where factors of social status and power combine with reproductive biology to
shape the experience of males and females"); R. TONG, supra note 25, at 200 ("differences of per-
spective between men and women. . . stem primarily from socially created and maintained inequali-
ties of knowledge and power"). Because these differences in perspective are socially created, they can
change over time depending upon changes in the status and power of women.
Some scholars argue that gender should not inform perspective. See, e.g., Wasserstrom, Racism,
Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REv. 581, 606 (1977)
(ideal society would follow assimilationist model of no differences between men and women: "It would
never teach about the inevitable or essential attributes of masculinity or femininity. . . . Were sex
like eye color, these things would make no sense."). Of course, the politics of either position has its
pitfalls: To overlook the inequalities that exist may be to accept oppression; to recognize the reality of
inequalities may be to perpetuate denigrating stereotypes. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution,
132 U. PA. L. RF'v. 955, 965 n.29 (1984).
52. See Zeisel, . . . And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U.
CHI. L. REv. 710, 715 (1971); see also Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 27, at 68 ("Jurors bring a
variety of perspectives to their deliberations that enables them to see beyond the single viewpoint of
the judge.").
53. 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (Louisiana statute requiring voluntary registration by potential female
jurors held to violate criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by impartial jury drawn
from "a fair cross section of the community").
54. 439 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1979) ("fair-cross-section" Sixth Amendment claim requires showing
of disproportionality among distinctive groups in community arising from systematic exclusion of
group in jury selection process).
55. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 233, 241 (1978).
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Gender-related perspectives have their strongest manifestation in rape
or death penalty cases. Obviously, no individual is confined to any one
perspective strictly because of gender; people's perspectives are gender-
related, not gender-specific. 5 6 Empirical studies, however, report differ-
ences in male and female jurors' attitudes on these subjects, and it is im-
portant that such different viewpoints are articulated during the delibera-
tions. Differences in attitudes toward rape and the death penalty appear
to be "the most powerful individual difference predictors" of verdict pref-
erences that researchers have studied to date.5"
According to empirical studies involving rape cases, female jurors are
more likely than male jurors to convict the defendant and to assign him a
longer sentence.58 One study found that female jurors were less influenced
by the rape victim's virginity or social status and were more likely to as-
sign the defendant a longer prison term than their male counterparts.59
Death penalty cases also seem to elicit a difference in attitudes between
men and women. Several studies have concluded that women are more
likely than men to oppose the death penalty, and consequently, to be ex-
cluded from "death-qualified" juries.60 Such exclusion limits the range of
56. Gilligan, Remapping Development: The Power of Divergent Data 11 (Jan. 1984) (unpub-
lished manuscript available in Yale Law School Library). Gilligan emphasizes that her discussion of
gender differences assumes that the observed differences do not apply to all men or all women (they
are not "gender-specific"), but that there is simply a discernible association or pattern (they are "gen-
der-related").
57. R. HASTIE, supra note 9, at 128. In any discussion of differences in attitude between men and
women, it is important to remember that views change during the deliberation process as jurors' own
biases are exposed, and as jurors are exposed to others' views. However, a range of views should be
represented on the jury, and articulated during deliberations, so that the jury can consider as broad a
spectrum as possible.
58. See Jacobson, Iffects of Victim's and Defendant's Physical Attractiveness on Subjects' Judg-
ments in a Rape Case, 7 SEx ROLES 247, 252-53 (1981) (women less likely than men to believe or
sympathize with alleged rapist, more likely to find him guilty, and to recommend longer prison sen-
tence). For other studies that report differences between male and female responses to rape cases, see
Calhoun, Selby & Warring, Social Perception of the Victim's Causal Role in Rape: An Exploratory
Examination of Four Factors, 29 HUM. REL. 517, 523 (1976) (male subjects believed victim contrib-
uted to rape to significantly greater degree than female subjects); Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt & Meek,
The Decision Processes of 6- and 12-Person Mock Juries Assigned Unanimous and Two-Thirds
Majority Rules, 32 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1, 6 (1975) (male subjects generally
judged rape to be more difficult to commit than female subjects); Rumsey & Rumsey, A Case of Rape:
Sentencing Judgments of Males and Females, 41 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 459, 464 (1977) (when evi-
dence of rape was ambiguous, male subjects were more likely than female subjects to blame victim).
59. S. Hoffman & T. Dodd, Attribution of Responsibility to an Accused Rapist as a Function of
Characteristics of the Victim and of the Subject 6-7 (unpublished manuscript), cited in Mahoney,
Sexism in Voir Dire: The Use of Sex Stereotypes injury Selection, in WOMEN IN THE COURTS 126
(W. Hepperle & L. Crites eds. 1978).
60. See Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors' Predispo-
sition To Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 53, 67 (1984) (poten-
tial jurors excluded from death-qualified juries more likely to be women); Fitzgerald & Ellsworth,
Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 31,
46 (1984) (death-qualified juries exclude women and blacks). A "death-qualified" jury is one in
which those who say that they could not vote for the death penalty in any case are excluded from the
jury.
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views that will be expressed and considered during the deliberations and
skews the range of community values represented on the jury. Empirical
studies show that death-qualified juries tend to be less critical of the pros-
ecutor's evidence and less concerned about due process guarantees than
"mixed" juries, consisting of jurors who oppose and jurors who accept the
death penalty."1
D. Improving the Education of the Citizenry
Jurors receive an education in democracy through full participation in a
democratic institution such as the jury.62 According to Tocqueville, the
jury serves as a "free school" to teach its citizens about the rights that
democracy entails.6" More recently, one commentator observed that jury
duty is the only governmental function in which citizens still play a direct
role.
6 4
When women first sought the right to jury duty, they argued that such
service would enlighten women about the judiciary and the responsibilities
of citizenship.65 If women today leave the jury room having learned that
their opinions are not as important as those of their male peers, then they
learn a harmful lesson.6 Women learn that they are not full citizens and,
in addition, men learn that they need not respect the rights of others.
Moreover, women will have lost the opportunity provided by their jury
duty to be active citizens with influence in the judicial process.
III. STEPS To ALLOW FOR FULL PARTICIPATION
A judicial understanding of the gender dynamics underlying small
group interactions should improve jury deliberations. Courts must recog-
nize the importance of group dynamics in jury deliberations and must take
steps to educate jurors about behavior that promotes effective delibera-
tions 6 7 Effective deliberations are critical if the jury is to reach accurate
61. Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth, supra note 60, at 72-73, 75-76 (mixed jury is more critical
of prosecution's evidence and more accurate in its recollection of facts of case than death-qualified
jury); Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 60, at 42-43, 46, 48 (those excluded from death-qualified
jury were more likely to be concerned about due process guarantees than those accepted).
62. See supra note 28.
63. A. DE TOC:QUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 275 (J. Mayer rev. ed. 1969) (13th ed.
1850).
64. Clark, The American Jury: A Justification, in SELECTED READINGS: THE JURY 1, 7 (G.
Winters ed. 1971).
65. See, e.g., Sawyer, Women as Jurors, 15 AM. MERCURY 139, 144 (1928) (jury duty will give
women "a new conception of government and of their rights and privileges, as well as of their duties
and responsibilities under it").
66. Gilligan emphasizes that jury duty also will teach a harmful lesson if "women experience
themselves in a situation where they're unable to speak." Interview with Carol Gilligan, Associate
Professor of Education, Harvard University, at Yale Law School (Feb. 18, 1986).
67. Ideally, the lessons of gender dynamics would be taught not only to jurors in the courtroom,
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verdicts. Of course, such education provides only a first step in making
jurors aware of their behavior. But if the court teaches jurors about gen-
der dynamics, just as it educates jurors about their other duties, then ju-
rors are likely to take the lesson seriously, just as they try to adhere to the
other instructions they receive. 8
From the moment jurors enter the court, they should be taught about
the effects of gender dynamics on their deliberations. They must be made
aware, throughout the entire process, of the need for women to speak and
for men to listen, so that both genders are participating equally. This
message can be conveyed in straightforward and gender-neutral language
through the variety of mediums the court already uses to educate jurors
about their duties.
The courts can use the handbook69 that is currently sent to jurors in the
mail or issued upon arrival to begin teaching jurors about the effects of
gender dynamics. Currently, many handbooks include a section on juror
behavior, in which jurors are advised to show consideration to their fellow
jurors.70 This section should be expanded to include a discussion of the
need for men and women both to speak and to listen to what others have
to say. The handbook also should urge jurors to refrain from interrupting
others or dominating discussion. 1 Such a revision of the federal courts'
handbook would be particularly timely, since the reference to juror behav-
ior in the handbook has not been updated in over twenty-five years.7
but also to children in the classroom.
68. Jurors will take the judge's instructions seriously because they want to perform their job well.
As Kalven pointed out:
[T]here is much evidence that most people, once actually serving in a trial, become highly
serious and responsible toward their task and toward the joint effort to deliberate through to a
verdict. Whether they are good at the job may be open to question, but that they are serious
about it and give it a real try is abundantly documentable.
Kalven, supra note 28, at 1062.
69. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, HANDBOOK FOR JURORS SERVING IN
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT (1975) [hereinafter HANDBOOK FOR JURORS] (current hand-
book). According to one survey of types of juror orientation provided by state courts, of 131 judicial
districts drawn from all 50 states, 64.1% provided a juror handbook. Forston, Sense and Non-Sense:
Jury Trial Communication, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 601, 624. However, the limitation of any handbook
is that it is given to the potential juror at the beginning of the process. The uncertainty of selection
may lead the potential juror merely to glance at, rather than to study, the handbook. Moreover,
because it is so early in the process, the message bears repeating at other points throughout the court
proceeding.
70. See, e.g., HANDBOOK FOR JURORS, supra note 69, at 11 ("The jurors have a duty to give full
consideration to the opinion [sic] of their fellow jurors.").
71. The federal courts should revise their juror handbook to include a section on group dynamics.
The handbook of Massachusetts state courts is one model insofar as it suggests the dynamics for
which the jury should strive: "No juror should dominate the discussion. No juror should remain quiet
and leave the speaking to others. Everyone should participate." OFFICE OF JURY COMM'R FOR THE
COMMONWEALTH, TRIAL JUROR'S HANDBOOK 21 (1984).
72. The 1975 HANDBOOK FOR JURORS, supra note 69, which is currently being distributed, has
the same text in the relevant section as the 1959 handbook: "The jurors have a duty to give full
consideration to the opinion [sic] of their fellow jurors." ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
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Similarly, the videotape73 that introduces the jurors to the court and the
legal process also should include a segment on effective deliberation meth-
ods.7 4 One videotape, for example, reminded the jurors that even though
the jury experience might be new to them, they should all feel confident
participating because they had all had experiences working in groups,
whether in a boardroom, church group, or P.T.A. meeting.75 Ideally, the
handbook and videotape should be coordinated so that each medium rein-
forces the message of the other. 6 In those courts where the judge gives an
introductory talk to the jurors,77 she also can offer a few comments on
how an awareness of group dynamics can lead to fuller participation by
all jurors, greater juror satisfaction with the process, and fairer decisions
for the plaintiff and defendant."
The voir dire is another opportunity for the judge or lawyers to educate
the jurors.79 Currently, it is common for judges, and for lawyers in some
HANDBOOK FOR JURORS SERVING IN THE UNITED STATES DisTRicT COURT 11 (1959). A random
survey of federal district courts' jury handbooks revealed use of the same handbook by all, although
Maine is currently using the 1959 edition.
73. See, e.g., Juror Orientation (Massachusetts Jury Management Advisory Committee 1978)
[hereinafter Juror Orientation] (videotape introducing jurors to courtroom procedures and several
legal concepts); The Juy: Those Who Serve (Mikan & Fleming 1979) [hereinafter The Jury: Those
Who Serve] (film used in New Haven Superior Court to acquaint jurors with jury duty).
74. The videotape could include a segment on which behaviors to avoid, such as jurors interrupt-
ing each other, denigrating each other's ideas, or failing to allow the more reticent members to speak.
The Massachusetts videotape, Juror Orientation, supra note 73, repeats the advice given in the hand-
book, supra note 71. Chief Justice James Lynch is the only speaker on this videotape. The message
about gender dynamics could be conveyed more effectively if the Massachusetts videotape used drama-
tization rather than lecture.
The New Haven film, The Jury: Those Who Serve, supra note 73, provides a more lively presenta-
tion than the Massachusetts videotape. It is in color rather than black-and-white, uses people and
dramatization to convey its message, and shows both men and women as judges and lawyers. Unfortu-
nately, it pays scant attention to the deliberations in general and ignores the subject of participation
completely. The film stresses the need for impartiality and admonishes jurors to "put aside all per-
sonal prejudices and sympathies," but does not offer advice about jurors' behavior toward each other.
Id. About foreperson selection, the film says only that "at some point in time one of the jurors will
have been selected foreman," and shows a male foreperson in a jury consisting of nine female jurors
and only three male jurors. Id. About deliberations, the film says only that "there will be debating,
some argument, and much talking." Id. A brief shot of two male jurors talking to each other com-
pletes the coverage of thi deliberations. The New Haven film should give suggestions about behaviors
to encourage and avoid during deliberations and should offer role models for women, such as a female
foreperson and female jurors engaged in discussion. It should seek to educate jurors about the deliber-
ations, just as it tries to teach them about other procedures such as voir dire.
75. Juror Orientation, supra note 73.
76. See Forston, supra note 69, at 627 ("[T]here is a need to coordinate the various training
procedures into a single orientation program. . . . One innovative way . . . would be to produce an
orientation film designed to be used in conjunction with a thorough, but readable, juror handbook.").
77. According to one survey, covering 131 different judicial districts drawn from all 50 states, state
court judges in 82.4% of the districts examined still gave some introductory remarks or orientation to
the jurors. Id. at 624.
78. Strodtbeck found that the level of an individual's satisfaction with her jury duty was positively
correlated with the level of her participation. Strodtbeck, supra note 9, at 716.
79. Many trial lawyers use voir dire as an opportunity to educate jurors about the meaning of
certain instructions and about their duties during the trial and deliberations. Severance & Loftus,
Improving the Ability of Jurors To Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAW &
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jurisdictions,"0 to remind jurors about what they have read in pamphlets
or seen in videotapes about jury duty. In that context, the jurors could be
reminded about what they have read and seen on gender dynamics and
group deliberations.81 Just as potential jurors are questioned about their
willingness to uphold the law, they could be questioned about their will-
ingness to speak during deliberations, to listen to others, and to encourage
others to speak and to listen."2
In jurisdictions where the judge selects the foreperson, she should make
sure that women are well represented over time. 3 A female foreperson
promotes greater awareness of gender dynamics.8 4 The presence of a fe-
male leader challenges stereotypes about women as followers and men as
leaders.85 A female leader also serves as a role model, thus creating a
Soc'Y R.%v. 153, 173 n.20 (1982). Judge Craig reports that during voir dire he includes "an eighth
grade civics lesson on how the court works," as well as a discussion of the indictment, of the statute on
which the indictment is based, and an explanation of the burden of proof. Craig, Erickson, Friesen &
Maxwell, Voir Dire: Criticism and Comment, 47 DENVER L.J. 465, 483 (1970).
80. According to one survey, based on 420 completed questionnaires, approximately three fourths
of federal district judges conduct the voir dire without oral participation of the attorneys. G.
BERMANT, CONDUCT OF THE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION: PRACTICES AND OPINIONS OF FEDERAL
DISTRICT JuDGES 6 (1977). According to another study, 53.4% of federal courts allow only the judge
to conduct voir dire in criminal cases; 31.1% allow the attorneys to submit supplemental questions;
13.2% allow the attorneys to ask all of the questions; and 2.3% allow the attorneys or clerks to ask
questions outside the presence of the court. WORKS OF THE COMM. ON THE OPERATION OF THE
JURY SYS. OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., THE JURY SYSTEM IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS 174 (1973). The trend is toward the judge-conducted voir dire. Ashby, Juror Selection and
the Sixth Amendment Right to an Impartial Jury, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1137, 1158 (1978). The
federal rules of civil and criminal procedure give federal courts discretion about whether they allow
attorneys to conduct the entire voir dire or merely to supplement questions asked by the court. See
FED. R. C1v. P. 47(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a).
81. 1 E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 3.01 (2d ed.
1970) (judge has wide discretion in questioning potential jurors during voir dire).
82. In the past, lawyers have used voir dire to uncover racist attitudes among prospective jurors
that could prevent them from applying the law. Van Dyke, Voir Dire: How Should It Be Conducted
To Ensure That Our Juries Are Representative and Impartial?, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 65,
65-67, 92-94 (1976); see, e.g., MINIMIZING RACISM IN JURY TRIALS (A. Ginger ed. 1969). Simi-
larly, voir dire can be used to expose sex-based biases. Soler, "A Woman's Place. . .". Combating
Sex-Based Prejudices in Jury Trials Through Voir Dire, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 535, 568-71
(1975). Soler suggests questions, such as: "Do you think that women are as observant about details as
men?" or "Do you feel that women should not be aggressive?" Id. at 586, 588. Such questions en-
courage jurors to examine their own attitudes on difficult issues. Lawyers could use voir dire to make
jurors aware of the effects of gender dynamics. Lawyers might ask of a seemingly shy juror: "If you
are selected as a juror, would you be willing to voice your opinions during deliberations?" or of a
seemingly talkative juror: "If you are selected as a juror, would you pay careful attention to what
others have to say and make sure to give others a chance to speak?" Lawyers would have to frame
their questions so as not to offend, just as they must take care when questioning those who hold racist
views and those who have been victims of racism.
83. See 1975 HANDBOOK FOR JURORS, supra note 69, at 11 ("In some districts the judge selects
the foreman of the jury."). Massachusetts is one state in which the judge selects the foreperson. Juror
Orientation, supra note 73.
84. See Reed, supra note 48, at 166-67 (in groups with women leaders, members learn more
about group dynamics and gender roles than in groups with male leaders).
85. Id.; see also Bartol & Wortman, Male Versus Female Leaders: Effects on Perceived Leader
Behavior and Satisfaction in a Hospital, 28 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 533, 544 (1975) ("[G]eneral
surveys [indicate] that actual experience working for female supervisors tends to reduce negative atti-
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setting in which other women do become more outspoken and assertive.8 6
In addition, a female foreperson is more likely than a male foreperson to
be concerned about the group's interaction and the need for all to speak
and to be heard.
7
The practice of requiring a jury to have a foreperson is a way in which
the court helps to structure the jury deliberations. Whether the judge
selects the foreperson or not, she should charge the foreperson to involve
those who are silent and restrain those who are dominating.88 The judge
should instruct the jurors, in language that is clear and free of jargon, on
their role in assisting the foreperson to carry out her duties.8 9 The jury's
tudes toward females as leaders."). But see Mayes, Women in Positions of Authority: A Case Study of
Changing Sex Roles, 4 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'Y 556, 561 (1979) ("Males in the female-
led groups regularly expressed a fear of having lost control."). Because the selection of female foreper-
sons challenges stereotypes of men as leaders, male jurors may resist female leadership and be uncoop-
erative during deliberations. One antidote may be the jurors' respect for an authority figure, the judge.
Note, Toward Principles ofJury Equity, 83 YALE L.J. 1023, 1049 (1974) (jurors may rely on judge's
instructions about proper behavior in same manner as subjects trust experimenter's judgments about
appropriate behavior); see also infra note 90.
Although challenging stereotypes may present a risk, allowing stereotypes to go unchallenged also
has its drawbacks. At the very least, women's opinions will remain unheard and their leadership skills
under-utilized. See, e.g., Eskilson & Wiley, Sex Composition and Leadership in Small Groups, 39
SOCioMETRY 183, 192 (1976) (in completion of group task, groups performed equally well under
male and female leadership, but female leaders were significantly less likely than male leaders to
choose themselves as future leaders); Megargee, Influence of Sex Roles on the Manifestation of Lead-
ership, 53 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 377, 378-81 (1969) (women who exhibit leadership qualities
still reluctant to exert leadership over male partners). One illustration of this loss of female leadership
was in the Harrisburg conspiracy trial. The defense attorneys recognized that Harold Sheets, a high
status, authoritative, fact-minded man was a strong candidate for foreperson of the jury. At the same
time, they recognized that another juror, Pat Schafer, was well-liked and respected and would have
been elected foreperson "if the jurors were not so accustomed to male authority." Schulman, Shaver,
Colman, Emrich & Christie, supra note 1, at 81.
86. See Mayes, supra note 85, at 560 (In female-led groups, women tended "to be more outspo-
ken, assertive, and dominant in the conversation. As each meeting began, a woman spoke first, con-
trary to patterns observed in small-group studies of male-led or leaderless groups.").
87. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text; see also Wexley & Hunt, Male and Female
Leaders: Comparison of Performance and Behavior Patterns, 35 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 867, 871
(1974) (female leaders exhibited more accommodative behaviors, such as agreeing more often, giving
more opinions, and asking for more suggestions, than did male leaders); Goleman, Studies Point to
Power of Nonverbal Signals, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1986, at Cl, col. I (women demonstrate greater
awareness than men of others' nonverbal cues).
88. If the foreperson makes a special effort to elicit the expression of all minority viewpoints (not
just those of women), then the jury will be more likely to avoid the dangers of "groupthink," in which
group members conform to the prevalent view and effectively limit the range of ideas expressed and
considered by the group. See I. JANIS, GROUPTHINK 262, 270-71 (2d ed. 1982).
89. Many researchers have noted the incomprehensibility of jury instructions as a hindrance to
proper jury performance. In one study, jury instructions were tested by actual deliberating jurors and
troublesome sections were rewritten to ensure comprehension. Severance & Loftus, supra note 79, at
161-62. Another study reported that all jury studies to date with the exception of one had found that
the "legalese" of jury instructions had hindered jurors' efforts to understand and apply the instruc-
tions properly. Forston, supra note 69, at 617; see also Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Lan-
guage Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 CoLusM. L. REv. 1306
(1979) (jury instructions are made difficult by awkward grammatical constructions); Meyer & Rosen-
berg, Questions Juries Ask. Untapped Springs of Insight, 55 JUDICATURE 105 (1971) (questions
arising from ambiguous jury instructions); Strawn & Buchanan,Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice,
59 JUDICATURE 478 (1976) (Florida study found jurors confused about jury instructions). See gener-
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awareness of gender dynamics, reinforced by such instructions, may help
to produce the more effective evidence-driven discussion.90
Currently, the judge plays a role in deciding which facts the jury will
consider, and to some extent, the way in which the deliberations will be
structured. The trial judge has discretion over procedural matters, which
can obviously have substantive implications. For example, the trial judge's
decisions about the admissibility of evidence determine which facts the
jury even will be allowed to consider during its deliberations." The judge
also can choose the verdict form and can offer instructions and comments
on the evidence.92 Through the use of special verdicts, the judge can con-
trol the structure of the deliberation by requiring the jury to answer only
the questions of fact posed by the judge.93 If the jury returns to the judge
because it is unable to reach a verdict, then the judge can instruct it to
continue its deliberations and to try, once again, to reach a verdict.94 After
a trial, a judge may direct a verdict, or grant a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict if the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict, or
ally A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J. ALFINI, MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982)
(guidelines for improving jury instructions); Sales, Elwork & Alfini, Improving Comprehension for
jury Instructions, in I P-SPECTIVES IN LAW & PSYCHOLOGY: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 23
(B. Sales ed. 1977) (jury instructions' comprehensibility can be improved through attention to vocabu-
lary, grammatical construction, and organization).
90. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text. Jurors might be particularly attuned to what
the judge says because they are uncertain about how to perform their new role and look to the special
knowledge and authority of the judge for guidance. Note, Judges' Nonverbal Behavior injury Trials:
A Threat to Judicial Impartiality, 61 VA. L. REV. 1266, 1278 (1975). In fact, the judge's influence is
thought to be so strong that her instructions must be framed carefully (hence the reliance on patterned
instructions) and can be reviewed stringently for any trace of partiality. See Andres v. United States,
333 U.S. 740, 765 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Charging a jury is not a matter of abraca-
dabra. No part of the conduct of a criminal trial lays a heavier task upon the presiding judge. The
charge is that part of the whole trial which probably exercises the weightiest influence upon jurors.").
A recent empirical study found that jurors are influenced not only by what the judge says, but also by
the way in which she says it. Note, The Appearance of Justice: Judges' Verbal and Nonverbal Be-
havior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89 (1985) (judges may convey their expectations
for trial outcome to jurors through subtle, nonverbal cues, such as facial expressions or tone of voice).
91. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.10 (1985).
92. The judge can choose a general verdict with or without interrogatories or a special verdict. See
1 E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 81, § 6.05 ; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 49; 9 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 2512, 2557 (1971) (court has discretion
to submit written interrogatories to jury along with general verdict; federal judges have discretion,
which state judges do not always have, to comment on evidence).
93. Johnston, Jury Subornation Through Judicial Control, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Au-
tumn 1980, at 24, 28-29.
For example, Judge Berdon expressed a preference for the use of interrogatories to the jury to force
the jurors to focus on facts and evidence before reaching any conclusions: "I specifically instruct [the
jury] not to try to reach a verdict until they've answered all the interrogatories. . . . Something like
that may really force them to focus on facts." Interview with Judge Robert Berdon, Connecticut
Superior Court, in New Haven (Feb. 24, 1986).
94. If a jury has decided that it has reached a deadlock, then the judge can deliver an "Allen
charge," which is "a sharp punch to the jury, reminding [the jurors] of the nature of their duty and
the time and expense of a trial, and urging them to try again to reach a verdict. We specifically have
approved the use of such a charge." United States v. Anderton, 679 F.2d 1199, 1203 (5th Cir. 1982)
(citations omitted).
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grant a new trial if the evidence was contrary to the jury's verdict. 6 The
proposal in this Note to educate jurors is substantially less intrusive than
such current practices. Moreover, through education, jurors will gain an
awareness of the deliberation process that will allow them both to control
their own deliberations and to perform their role more effectively.
IV. CONCLUSION
Numerous empirical studies of mock juries all identify the same pat-
tern: Women have a lower participation rate than men during delibera-
tions. Because the jury carries out its tasks through the exchange of ideas
communicated by words, active verbal participation is essential for finding
the facts, applying the law to the facts, and rendering an accurate verdict
that represents the values of the community. The jury's ability to perform
these tasks effectively is fundamental to the fairness of our system of jus-
tice. The jury cannot perform its tasks effectively unless both women and
men speak and listen to each other. Only then will the jury have a style of
deliberation likely to elicit different points of view; only then will the jury
have a full range of facts and perspectives to consider. If the court system
fails to educate jurors about the effects of gender dynamics on the deliber-
ation process, then the representativeness and accuracy of the jury will
continue to be compromised. Courts should draw from studies in organi-
zational behavior, as they have drawn from empirical studies in the past,
to educate jurors about the dynamics of the jury, so that both men and
women can participate fully during deliberations.
95. Johnston, supra note 93, at 29-30, 48.
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